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Formalising trade-offs beyond algorithmic





There is growing concern that decision-making informed by ma-
chine learning (ML) algorithms may unfairly discriminate based on
personal demographic attributes, such as race and gender. Scholars
have responded by introducing numerous mathematical definitions of
fairness to test the algorithm, many of which are in conflict with one
another. However, these reductionist representations of fairness often
bear little resemblance to real-life fairness considerations, which in
practice are highly contextual. Moreover, fairness metrics tend to be
implemented in narrow and targeted toolkits that are difficult to inte-
grate into an algorithm’s broader ethical assessment. In this paper, we
derive lessons from ethical philosophy and welfare economics as they
relate to the contextual factors relevant for fairness. In particular
we highlight the debate around acceptability of particular inequalities
and the inextricable links between fairness, welfare and autonomy. We
propose Key Ethics Indicators (KEIs) as a way towards providing a
more holistic understanding of whether or not an algorithm is aligned
to the decision-maker’s ethical values.
Introduction
Algorithms are increasingly used to inform critical decisions in across high-
impact domains, from credit risk evaluation to hiring to criminal justice.
These algorithms are using more data from non-traditional sources and em-
ploying advanced techniques in machine learning (ML) and deep learning
(DL) that are often difficult to interpret. The result is rising concern that
these algorithmic predictions may be misaligned to the designer’s intent, an
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organisation’s legal obligations, and societal expectations, such as discrim-
inating based on personal demographic attributes. In response, there has
been a proliferation of literature on algorithmic fairness aiming to quantify
the deviation of their predictions from a formalised metric of equality be-
tween groups (e.g. male and female). Dozens of notions of fairness have
been proposed, prompting efforts (Verma and Rubin, 2018) to disentangle
their differences and rationale.
In line with this, a number of fairness toolkits1 have been introduced to
test the algorithm’s predictions against various fairness definitions. The fair-
ness toolkit landscape so far reflects the reductionist understanding of fairness
as mathematical conditions, as the implementations rely on narrowly defined
fairness metrics to provide “pass/fail” reports. These toolkits can sometimes
give practitioners conflicting information about an algorithm’s fairness, which
is unsurprising given that it is mathematically impossible to meet some of
the fairness conditions simultaneously (Kleinberg, Mullainathan, and Ragha-
van, 2016). This is reflective of the conflicting visions of fairness espoused by
each mathematical definition and the underlying ethical assumptions (Binns,
2020).
A recent paper surveying the fairness toolkit landscape (Lee and Singh,
2020) found there were significant gaps between ML practitioner needs and
the toolkits’ features, especially regarding means that helped practitioners
account for the contextual specifics of their use case – one practitioner com-
menting the toolkits “make everything look clear-cut, which it really isn’t ‘in
the wild’ ” (Lee and Singh, 2020). Other studies involving ML practitioners
have similarly emphasised the need for domain-specific and contextual factors
to be closely considered to improve algorithmic fairness (Veale, Van Kleek,
and Binns, 2018). In particular, in many domains, practitioners claim that
fairness cannot be understood in terms of well-defined quantitative metrics
(Holstein, Wortman Vaughan, Daumé III, Dudik, and Wallach, 2019).
This disconnect between real-world needs and axiomatic fairness defini-
tions is not new. Hutchinson and Mitchell (2019) warn of the gap between
the unambiguous formalisation of fairness metrics and the contextual and
practical needs of society, politics, and law. They compared the recent surge
in ML fairness research to literature from the 60s and 70s, which fizzled as
“no statistic that could unambiguously indicate whether or not an item is
fair was identified. There were no broad technical solutions to the issues
involved in fairness” (Cole, 1973). From a legal standpoint, the approach in
1For example: IBM Fairness 360 (Bellamy, Dey, Hind, Hoffman, Houde, Kannan, Lo-
hia, Martino, Mehta, Mojsilovic, et al., 2018), UChicago Aequitas tool (Saleiro, Kuester,
Stevens, Anisfeld, Hinkson, London, and Ghani, 2018))
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automating “fairness testing” appears incompatible with the requirements
of EU non-discrimination law, which relies heavily on the context-sensitive,
intuitive, and ambiguous evidence (Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Russell, 2020).
Fairness toolkits aim to be widely accessible, drawing attention to fair-
ness considerations, and encouraging and supporting practitioners to con-
sider, assess (and therefore mitigate) their algorithms in leading to unfair
outcomes. However, without a consideration of the relevant context in the
socio-technical system surrounding the algorithm, these tools risk engender-
ing false confidence in flawed algorithms. Different considerations come into
play for each use case. That is, organisations should not rely solely on one-
dimensional algorithmic fairness metrics to account for its ethical concerns.
These narrow applications of fairness could mislead organisational strategy,
risk management, and policies.
Towards this, in this paper we draw from literature in ethical philoso-
phy and welfare economics to pinpoint the relevant contextual information
that should be considered in an understanding of a model’s ethical impact.
We argue that any future development of fairness toolkits should be framed
within a broader view of ethical concerns to ensure their adoption promotes
a contextually appropriate assessment of each algorithm.
To this end, we propose a new approach using Key Ethics Indicators
(KEIs) to provide a more holistic understanding of whether or not an al-
gorithm is aligned to the decision-maker’s values. Though resembling some
previous work on domain-specific trade-off analyses in fairness metrics vs.
public safety (Corbett-Davies and Goel, 2018) and vs. financial inclusion
(Lee and Floridi, 2020), our paper generalises the steps required for a holis-
tic ethical assessment.
Our contribution is two-fold: 1) the identification of relevant contextual
factors for fairness as drawn from ethical philosophy and welfare economics
and 2) the proposal of a “Key Ethics Indicator” approach for a more com-
prehensive understanding of an algorithm’s potential impact.
1 Definitions
We start by defining key terms: ethics, justice, fairness, equality, discrimina-
tion, and protected characteristics. This will frame our subsequent discus-
sions on the contextual considerations for algorithmic ethics beyond what can
be assessed using fairness metrics. While these dimensions the terms cover
do not comprehensively cover all relevant aspects of algorithmic ethics, they
clearly demonstrate the limitations of mathematical fairness formalisations
in capturing necessary information about the algorithmic system.
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As many organisations have launched initiatives to establish ethical prin-
ciples, “AI ethics” definitions may vary; however, Floridi and Cowls identify
the five common themes across these sets of principles: beneficence, non-
maleficence, autonomy, justice, and explicability (Floridi and Cowls, 2019).
We define algorithmic ethics along these five dimensions.
A study of proposed ethical principles finds that different countries’ and
organisations’ understanding of justice varies for each document, from the
elimination of discrimination to promoting diversity to shared prosperity
(Floridi and Cowls, 2019). For the purpose of this paper, we distinguish
between justice and fairness in accordance with legal and organisational
science literature, with justice denoting adherence to the standards agreed
upon in society (e.g. based on laws) and fairness as a related principle of an
evaluative judgement of whether a decision is morally right (Goldman and
Cropanzano, 2015).
In line with this definition, fairness is inherently subjective. The concept
is based on the egalitarian foundation that humans are fundamentally equal
and should be treated equally. However, how equality should be measured
and to what extent it is desirable have been a source of debate in both
philosophical ethics from a moral standpoint, and welfare economics from a
market efficiency standpoint. What are the relevant criteria based on which
limited resources should be distributed? For example, Aristotle wrote that
if there are fewer flutes available than people who want to play them, they
should be given to the best performers (Aristotle and Sinclair, 1962).
From a legal standpoint, discrimination refers to the notion that certain
demographic characteristics, such as race and gender, should not result in
a relative disadvantage of deprivation. Non-discrimination laws aim to not
only prevent ongoing discrimination but also to change societal policies and
practices to achieve more substantive equality – an aim which is described
as incompatible with some fairness metrics (Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Rus-
sell, 2021). While legal analysis is outside the scope of this paper, we refer
to protected characteristics as those commonly referenced and reflected in
non-discrimination laws, such as race and ethnicity, gender, religion, age,
disability, and sexual orientation, given these personal demographic features
are central to discussions in algorithmic fairness literature. We also refer
to ‘direct’ discrimination, which concerns differential treatment based on a
protected characteristic and “indirect” discrimination, which represents an
inadvertent negative impact on a protected group (Wachter et al., 2021).
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2 Computer science literature
2.1 Fairness metrics
Existing mathematical definitions of fairness, while loosely derived from a
notion of egalitarianism, should be calculated while keeping in mind the
nuances and context-specificity present in philosophical discourse. We will
walk through a use case: a lender building a model to predict a prospective
borrower’s risk of default on a loan. In this case, the False Positives (FP)
represent lost opportunity (predicted default, but would have repaid), and
the False Negatives (FN) represent lost revenue (predicted repayment, but
defaulted).
The calculations of error rates used in the metrics are defined below, with
some of the most commonly cited fairness definitions in Table 1:
• True Positive Rate (TPR) = TP/(TP + FN)
• True Negative Rate (TNR) = TN/(FP + TN)
• False Positive Rate (FPR) = FP/(FP + TN) = 1 – TNR
• False Negative Rate (FNR) = FN/(FN + TP) = 1 – TPR
• Positive Predictive Value (PPV) = TP/(TP+FP)
There are difficulties in deciding which metric is most appropriate for each
use case (Lee and Floridi, 2020). Is a 3% increase in positive predictive parity
preferable over a 5% increase in equal odds? Moreover that many of these
metrics cannot be satisfied at the same time (Kleinberg et al., 2016), it is not
intuitive on which metric best represents the lender’s interests. These issues
will be further discussed in §3, where we will link each fairness metric to its
philosophical origin and address the gaps. In the next section, we challenge
the types of inequalities that the fairness metrics assume are acceptable vs.
unacceptable.
2.2 Acceptability of inequalities
First, we challenge the fairness metrics’ assumed simplicity and separability
of unacceptable bias by discussing the complexity of the debates on equality
in ethical philosophy. Note that these metrics are aimed at a class of ma-
chine learning algorithms that are supervised, i.e. with a known outcome,
and for classification purposes, i.e. for a discrete outcome (e.g. default vs.
repayment) rather than a continuous outcome (e.g. amount repaid). These
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Fairness metric Equalising Intuition (Example)
Maximise total accuracy N/A The most accurate model gives people
the loan and interest rate they ‘deserve’
by minimising errors
Demographic parity, group fair-
ness, disparate impact (Feldman,
Friedler, Moeller, Scheidegger,
and Venkatasubramanian, 2015)
Outcome Black and white applicants have the
same loan approval rates
Equal opportunity / false neg-
ative error rate balance (Hardt,
Price, and Srebro, 2016)
FNR Among applicants who are credit-
worthy and would have repaid their
loans, both black and white applicants
should have similar rate of their loans
being approved
False positive error rate bal-
ance / predictive equality
(Chouldechova, 2017)
FPR Among applicants who would default,
both black and white applicants should
have similar rate of their loans being
denied
Equal odds (Hardt et al., 2016) TPR, TNR Meets both of above conditions
Positive predictive parity
(Chouldechova, 2017)
PPV Among credit-worthy applicants, the
probability of predicting repayment is
the same regardless of race





Both credit-worthy white and black ap-
plicants who repay their loans have an
equal average probability score
Negative class balance




Both white and black defaulters have
an equal average probability score
Counterfactual fairness (Kusner,








For each individual, if he/she were a dif-
ferent race, the prediction would be the
same
Individual fairness (Dwork,





For each individual, he/she has the
same outcome as another ‘similar’ in-
dividual of a different race
Table 1: Fairness metrics
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algorithms aim to identify the features that are associated with the outcome
of interest. For example, one with higher income is more likely to be ap-
proved for a loan due to its association with higher ability to repay. In this
case, differences in socioeconomic status is accepted as an inequality that is
important to consider in the loan decision. Previously, scholars have made
the distinction between “acceptable” vs. “unacceptable” inequalities based
on legal precedents between “explainable” and “non-explainable” discrimi-
nation (Kamiran and Žliobaitė, 2013) based on Rawlsian philosophy between
“relevant” and “irrelevant” features (Rawls, 1999). For example, income may
be considered a “relevant” feature, and gender or race may be considered an
“irrelevant” feature. The former should influence the algorithmic decisions,
but the latter should not.
Scholars attempting to formalise these criteria into a mathematical defi-
nition of fairness have needed to address what type of equality is deemed to
be fair. Some assume that any disparity in a given outcome metric is un-
acceptable (Gajane and Pechenizkiy, 2017): for example, loan approval rate
for men and women should be the same. Others assume a level playing field
(Gajane and Pechenizkiy, 2017): for example, there is no gender or racial dis-
crimination in the real world that may affect the data. More recent work has
taken a more nuanced stance, suggesting that the only features that should
contribute to the outcome disparity are those that can be controlled by the
individual, emphasising a distinction between the features driven by “effort”
vs. “circumstances” (Heidari, Loi, Gummadi, and Krause, 2018). This is
following the logic of Dworkin’s theory of Resource Egalitarianism, no one
should end up worse off due to bad luck, but rather, people should be given
differentiated economic benefits as a result of their own choices (Dworkin,
1981).
Mathematical fairness formalisations must first determine which inequal-
ities are “unacceptable.” Some assume that all disparity in a given outcome
metric is unacceptable, while others assume a level playing field (Gajane and
Pechenizkiy, 2017), an assumption rarely met in societal challenges. Others
emphasise the need to separate “effort” and “circumstances,” suggesting that
the only features that should contribute to the outcome disparity are those
that can be controlled by the individual (Heidari et al., 2018). Another paper
distinguishes between “benign” disparities and structural bias that should be
corrected (Binns, 2020).
In reality, the layers of inequality between two individuals are intertwined,
dynamic, and difficult to disentangle from one another. Consider the layers of
inequality in Table 2. Two individuals may be unequal on several levels – in
their level and type of talent, parents’ socioeconomic status, behaviour, etc. –
that may affect the target outcome of interest, whether it is credit-worthiness,
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Types of inequality Examples Variable
Natural inequality Disability at birth Inequality 0
Socioeconomic inequality Parents’/guardians’ assets Inequality 1
Talent inequality Intelligence, skills, employ-
ment prospects
Inequality 2
Preference inequality Saving behaviour, cultural
prioritisation of values associ-
ated with economic opportu-
nities
Inequality 3
Treatment inequality / so-
cietal discrimination (ex-
ternal)
Discrimination in job market
and education system affect-
ing income stability
Inequality 4
Table 2: Layers of inequality affecting the ground truth (*partial and indica-
tive)
predicted performance at a job, or insurance risk. It is possible that the
differences in the observed outcome are attributable to one or more of the
above inequalities. Building an algorithm to predict the outcome could result
in a faithful representation of these inequalities and the resulting replication
and perpetuation of the same inequality through decisions informed by its
predictions. However, which of the inequalities should be allowed to influence
the model’s prediction? We present the limitations of proposals thus far on
how this question should be addressed.
2.2.1 Legally protected characteristics
The open source fairness toolkits often refer specifically to protected at-
tributes in their assessment of fairness. For example, Fairness 360 defines
protected attribute one that “partitions a population into groups whose out-
comes should have parity. Examples include race, gender, caste, and religion”
(Bellamy et al., 2018). While they acknowledge protected attributes may be
application-specific, there is limited guidance on under what circumstances
two groups should have parity in outcomes. In addition, how much disparity
is acceptable in each use case and for each sub-group of interest? In order
for the applications to be adopted across domain areas, it is important for
practitioners to have a clear idea of what types of demographic features are
acceptable vs. unacceptable to consider in an algorithm. However, often,
computer science literature use these demographic features to assess fairness
without challenging whether they are relevant to the decision at-hand.
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Whether a disparity in fairness metrics between legally protected groups
is fair depends on the context. Race and gender may be causally relevant in
differential medical diagnosis (e.g. sickle cell anaemia, ovarian cancer) due to
the different biological mechanisms in question. If the differences in outcome
are causally related to the protected feature, the difference in decisions may
be arguably fair. If a man has a higher income than a woman, he may receive
a higher credit limit given his higher ability to repay.
2.2.2 Effort vs. circumstances
The suggestion to distinguish between the features driven by “effort” vs.
“circumstances” in algorithmic fairness (Heidari et al., 2018) follows the logic
of Dworkin’s theory of Resource Egalitarianism, no one should end up worse
off due to bad luck, but rather, people should be given differentiated economic
benefits as a result of their own choices (Dworkin, 1981).
However, in reality, it is difficult to separate out what is within an indi-
vidual’s genuine control. For example, a credit market does not exist in a
vacuum; while potential borrowers can improve their creditworthiness to a
certain extent, e.g. by building employable skills and establishing a responsi-
ble payment history, it is difficult to isolate the features from discrimination
in other markets, layers of inequality, and the impact of their personal history.
In addition to the challenge of defining what is within our control, some
circumstances are necessary to take into account in a decision-making pro-
cess. For example, one may not be in full control of one’s income or education
level, but they are crucial indicators of credit risk given they indicate greater
job security. Socioeconomic and talent inequalities may be considered rele-
vant in a credit risk evaluation algorithm, but they are not necessarily within
our control.
2.2.3 Source of inequality
Scholars have also proposed that the source of inequality should determine
which fairness metric is appropriate for each use case, i.e. whether the out-
come disparity is explainable, justifiable, or benign or due to structural dis-
crimination (Kamiran and Žliobaitė, 2013; Binns, 2020). Binns (2020) sug-
gests group fairness metrics assumes disparities are benign, e.g. the loan
approval difference between white and black applicants is solely due to their
differences in ability to repay; statistical parity assumes structural bias that
requires correction, e.g. historically, black applicants’ risk have been inflated
due to past discriminatory practices. However, in reality, there is rarely such
a separation. For example, Lee and Floridi review the literature on U.S.
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mortgage lending and suggest that there are many structural and statistical
factors that lead the lenders to both over-estimate and under-estimate the
risk of black borrowers (Lee and Floridi, 2020).
Any attempt to isolate the impact of discrimination from the impact of
“benign” inequality needs to also consider the intersectional discrimination
faced by those already marginalised in society (Crenshaw, 1989), e.g. the
inter-connectivity of gender and racial discrimination (Collins, 2002). The
boundary between what is an acceptable representation of existing inequal-
ities and what is due to systematic discrimination and marginalisation of a
group is challenging to ascertain.
Fleurbaey (2008) also cautions that “responsibility-sensitive egalitarian-
ism” in welfare economics could be used to hastily justify inequalities and
unfairly chastise the “undeserving poor” (Fleurbaey et al., 2008). He points
out that the idea that people should bear the consequences of their choices
is not as simple as it seems; it only makes sense when individuals are put
in equal conditions of choice. Such an equality is not true in most systems.
When one has fewer opportunities than another, one cannot be held fully
responsible insofar as one’s choice is more constrained.
2.2.4 Takeaways
The assumed clear and intuitive separation between acceptable and unac-
ceptable inequalities, whether based on their source or the role of luck, rarely
exists in real-life models. Not only is making the distinction impractical, the
boundary itself is more controversially debated than it is often portrayed
in algorithmic fairness literature, especially in computer science. The crite-
ria for desirable equality depend on the philosophical perspective, which is
ultimately a subjective judgement.
The decision on the target state—the way it ought to be—is an ethical
decision with mathematically inevitable trade-offs between objectives of in-
terest. Heidari et al. dismiss the distinction between relevant vs. irrelevant
features in practice as out of scope for their paper: “Determining account-
ability features and effort-based utility is arguably outside the expertise of
computer scientists” (Heidari et al., 2018). On the contrary, we argue that
computer scientists and model developers must be actively engaged in the
discussion on what layers of inequality should and should not be influencing
the model’s prediction, as this directly influences not only the model design
and feature selection but also the selection of performance metrics.
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3 Lessons from ethical philosophy on (in)equalities
Ethical philosophers have long debated whether equality is desirable and
– if so – what type of equality people should pursue in society. Table 3
gives an example of philosophical perspectives and their perceptions of what
types of inequality are acceptable. Formal equality of opportunity (EOP),
or procedural fairness, posits that all opportunities should be equally open
to all applicants (e.g. jobs, loans, etc.) based on a relevant definition of
merit. However, in theory, this can be fully satisfied even if only a minority
segment of a population (e.g. those with family wealth and connections) have
realistic prospects of accessing the opportunity. In other words, as long as the
opportunity is theoretically available, it is irrelevant whether it is practically
accessible.
The Rawlsian fair EOP goes further to propose that any individuals with
the same native talent and ambition should have the same prospects of suc-
cess, requiring that all competitive advantage (e.g. parental efforts) be offset
(Rawls, 1999). This is at odds with Lockean and libertarian ideals that as-
sert the value of each person’s freedom insofar as there is no harm to another
(Nozick, 1974), which naturally extends to the right to ownership and capital.
Rawls also proposes the Difference Principle as an exception: economic and
social inequalities can only be justified if they benefit the most disadvantaged
members of society (Rawls, 1999). These EOP principles are in contrast to
the strict equality of outcome, condition, or welfare, which requires an equal
distribution regardless of any relevant criteria.
Luck egalitarians hold that unchosen inequalities must be eliminated
(Dworkin, 1981). Sen and Fleurbaey object on the grounds that luck egali-
tarians have no principled objection to a society in which, on a background
of equal opportunities, some end up in poverty or as the slaves of others
(Fleurbaey et al., 2008). They argue for a more substantive equality of “au-
tonomy” that includes the full range of individual freedom.
Some have argued that what is important is not relative condition com-
pared to other people, but rather, whether people have enough to have sat-
isfactory life prospects (Walzer, 1983). Others have shifted the focus on the
incremental gain of well-being of those who are worst-off (Parfit, 1991). Yet
others have debated the foundations of desert, or what one deserves corre-
sponding to his or her virtue (Kagan, 2014).
3.1 Ethical subjectivity of algorithmic fairness
As such, what types of inequality in outcome are fair is a philosophical and
subjective debate with nuances and complexities insufficiently addressed in
11
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Philosophical per-
spective





Any inequality as long as the
opportunity was open to all
Treatment inequality
“Fair equality of op-
portunity” (Rawls,
1999, 2001)







Natural, talent, and prefer-
ence inequalities, plus any in-
equality benefiting the most
disadvantaged society mem-




/ condition / welfare
(Greenberg, 1987)
None - all members should get











Inequality resulting in ”gen-
uinely free” choices





Any inequality as long as ev-
eryone is above the level of
sufficiency







allocation to those who are
worst off




Any inequality based on what
he/she ”deserves”
Any inequality that does not
equate to the person’s deserv-
ingness
Table 3: Key philosophical perspectives on inequality
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existing algorithmic fairness literature. What happens when faithfully rep-
resenting the world as it is perpetuates an unfair state of affairs? This com-
plicates the objective of machine learning, which is only reliable insofar as it
is trained on data sets that reflects reality. To forecast sales, an algorithm
learns from data representative of the company’s customers. For example,
online searches for “CEO” yield mostly images of white men, and online
job postings may show high-income positions to men more frequently than
women (Van Dam, 2019). This may result in a biased outcome, with men
securing disproportionately high-paying jobs. However, this is reflective of
the existing gender pay gap: in 2019, only 6.6% of Fortune 500 top executives
were female, the highest proportion in history (Zillman, 2019). Continuing to
under-represent women in search results may perpetuate the bias that CEOs
are typically men. In this instance, some call for the “correction” of the bias
to reflect judgements about the way the world should be, which is by nature
an ethically influenced choice.
As previously stated, on the contrary to past scholars’ arguments (Heidari
et al., 2018), our position is that computer scientists and model developers
cannot completely delegate this consideration to a third party, whether it is
the regulator, business leader, or the risk function. Model developers must
be engaged in the discussion on what layers of inequality should and should
not be influencing the model’s prediction in order to inform their decisions
on model design, feature selection, and performance metric selection.
Overall, in formalising fairness, the decision-maker should be explicit on
1) which inequalities and biases exist that affect the outcome of interest and
2) on which of them should be retained and which of them should be actively
corrected. This will be further addressed in our proposal of Key Ethics
Indicators (KEIs). We next link some of the fairness metrics to the ethical
philosophy that inspired them, pointing out the contextual considerations
in the ethical philosophy that should be kept in mind alongside the fairness
formalisations.
3.2 Linking ethical philosophy to algorithmic fairness
Existing mathematical definitions of fairness, while loosely derived from a
notion of egalitarianism, should be calculated while keeping in mind the
nuances and context-specificity present in philosophical discourse. Revisiting
the fairness metrics from Table 1, this section will show link each metric to
the ethical philosophy that inspired it, as well as addressing the gaps between
the philosophical work and what is represented in the mathematical formula.
In discussing the entries of Table 4 in order: accuracy maximisation is
prone to biases introduced in the model development lifecycle that may skew
13
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Fairness metric Equalising Philosophy
Maximise total accuracy N/A Desert (Kagan, 1999, 2014)
Demographic parity, group
fairness, disparate impact
(Feldman et al., 2015)
Outcome Strict egalitarianism (Equal-
ity of outcome / condition /
welfare) (Greenberg, 1987)
Equal opportunity / false
negative error rate balance
(Hardt et al., 2016)
FNR
False positive error rate bal-
ance / predictive equality
(Chouldechova, 2017)
FPR





PPV “Fair equality of opportunity”
(Rawls, 1999, 2001)
Positive class balance














the person had a
different attribute








tarianism (Fleurbaey et al.,
2008)
Table 4: Fairness metrics and their philosophical origins
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the predictions, which is especially problematic if the biases reflect patterns
of societal discrimination, leading to “undeserved” outcomes contrary to the
philosophy of desert. Demographic parity is problematic if there are legiti-
mate rationale behind the unequal outcome (e.g. unequal income).
The equal opportunity metric, while it sounds attractively similar to
Rawlsian EOP, fails to address discrimination that may already be embed-
ded in the data (Gajane and Pechenizkiy, 2017). Discrimination may be
crystallised in the data set due to biased data collection (e.g. selective mar-
keting), biased data labelling (e.g. humans scoring male candidates as more
competent), or biased human decisions feeding the system (e.g. if courts
are more likely to find black defendants as guilty). Rawlsian EOP also as-
sumes that inequalities in native talent and ambition may result in unequal
outcomes, which is not addressed in the equalisation of false negative rates.
Each group fairness metric, including equal odds, positive predictive parity,
and positive / negative class balance, requires different assumptions about
the gap between the observed space (features) vs. the construct space (un-
observable variables): “if there is structural bias in the decision pipeline, no
[group fairness] mechanism can guarantee fairness” (Friedler, Scheidegger,
and Venkatasubramanian, 2016). This is supported in a critique of exist-
ing classification parity metrics, in which the authors conclude that “to the
extent that error metrics differ across groups, that tells us more about the
shapes of the risk distributions than about the quality of decisions” (Corbett-
Davies and Goel, 2018). In many domains in which there are concerns over
unfair algorithmic bias, including credit risk and employment, there has often
been a documented history of structural and societal discrimination, which
may affect the underlying data through biases previously discussed.
The challenge of individual fairness approach is: how to define “similar-
ity” that is, for example, independent of race (Kim, Reingold, and Roth-
blum, 2018). When the predictive features are also influenced by protected
features, designation of a measurement of “similarity” cannot be indepen-
dent of those protected features. For example, what proportion of gender
income disparity is due to structural employment discrimination as opposed
to job preferences? Some scholars have attempted to incorporate active cor-
rections for racial inequality into metrics of similarity (Dwork et al., 2012),
but this depends heavily on the assumption that the inequality due to racial
discrimination can be isolated from other sources of inequality.
While counter-factual fairness metric provides an elegant abstraction of
the algorithm, the causal mechanisms, e.g. of a default on a loan or on
insurance risk, are typically not well understood. It is also difficult to isolate
the impact of one’s protected feature, e.g. race, on the outcome, e.g. risk
of default, from the remaining features. The approach is also sensitive to
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unmeasured confounding variables, which may add additional discriminatory
bias (Kilbertus, Ball, Kusner, Weller, and Silva, 2019).
In all, these metrics do not give any information on which layers of in-
equalities they are attempting to correct, which risks over- or under-correction.
A deeper engagement with the ethical assumptions being made in each model
is necessary to understand the drivers of the unequal outcomes. What types
of inequalities are acceptable depends on the context of the model. Our KEI
approach will account for such context-specificity of what inequalities are
acceptable.
4 Lessons from welfare economics
Referring back to our definition of algorithmic ethics, justice is only one of
five dimensions (beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, justice, and expli-
cability), with fairness as a key principle related to justice. We derive lessons
from literature on welfare economics to demonstrate the interconnectedness
of fairness and welfare (beneficience and non-maleficence) and liberty (auton-
omy and explicability). By focusing narrowly on the fairness metrics, which
quantify the redistribution of the target outcome, a decision-maker may over-
look the key considerations of the impact on the stakeholders’ welfare and
autonomy. Because of the challenge in quantifying the relevant biases and
disentangling them from the outcome of interest, correcting for a bias carries
the risk of increasing the inaccuracies of the predictions. Beyond the egalitar-
ian perspective on the relative distribution of resources between individuals
and groups, it is important to consider the aggregate impact of an algorithm
on the society.
4.1 Welfare in algorithmic ethics: beneficence and non-
maleficence
We use an example concerning credit risk evaluation to argue that fairness
should be considered alongside welfare. In attempting to improve a fairness
metric, a decision-maker may inadvertently forego an algorithm that leaves
everyone better-off (beneficence) or may inadvertently harm the sub-group
they are attempting to help to “level the playing field.” Fairness metrics
should not be taken at face value without an understanding of how they
may affect other ethical objectives. Fairness toolkits that assess fairness in
isolation risks misleading the decision-makers by giving the them incomplete
information about whether their algorithm meets their ethical objectives.
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From a welfare economic standpoint, a notion of fairness includes a con-
sideration of well-being: from both utilitarian and libertarian perspectives, a
fair reward principle maximises the sum total of individual well-being levels
while legitimising redistribution that enhances the total outcome of indi-
viduals (Fleurbaey et al., 2008). This is not necessarily contradictory to
the egalitarian perspectives discussed in ethical philosophy. In accordance
with the Difference Principle, Rawlsian EOP Max-Min social welfare function
should also maximise the welfare of those who are worst-off (Rawls, 1999).
A model that results in financial harm of already-disadvantaged populations
fails to meet the Rawlsian EOP criteria, even if the False Negative Rates
are equalised as per the mathematical definition. Without consideration of
the long-term impact on welfare, the fairness metrics fail to capture the full
extent of ethical dilemma embedded in a model selection process.
Accuracy is often considered in trade-off with fairness (Kleinberg et al.,
2016), but from an ethical standpoint, that accuracy may represent a key
principle in beneficence or non-maleficence. For an example of beneficence,
a “good” credit risk algorithm would lower the aggregate portfolio risk for
the lender, enabling more loans to more people and giving them access to
credit that is crucial to upward socioeconomic mobility. For an example
of non-maleficence, the false positive rates (i.e. loans that were approved
but defaulted) also contains information about whether unaffordable loans
are granted. A lender should aim to minimise the borrower’s financial diffi-
culty, given the adverse effects of unaffordable debt on both the market level
(causing instability and a “bubble”) and for the borrower (Aggarwal, 2018).
The ethical principle of non-maleficence may be in direct conflict with
fairness in some circumstances. Adding fairness constraints may end up
harming the groups they intended to protect in the long-term (Liu, Dean,
Rolf, Simchowitz, and Hardt, 2018). In the presence of a feedback loop, we
need to consider not only providing a resource (a loan) to an applicant in a
disadvantaged group, but also what happens as a result of that resource. If
the borrower defaults, his/her credit score will decline, potentially preclud-
ing the borrower from future loans. It is important to view fairness, not in
isolation at a moment in time, but rather, in the context of long-term objec-
tives in promoting the customer’s financial well-being. This is a part of the
context we formalise in our Key Ethics Indicator proposal.
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4.2 Liberty in algorithmic ethics: autonomy and ex-
plicability
Fairness should also be assessed within the context of how the algorithm
affects human liberty, a subject in welfare economics that is relevant to
the AI ethics principles of autonomy and explicability. Fleurbaey argues
responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism in welfare economics should move away
from “responsibility,” which may overlook certain people’s lack of freedom
to choose alternatives, and towards “autonomy” (Fleurbaey et al., 2008). In
other words, for there to be “true” equality, three conditions must be met:
1) a minimum level of autonomy is attained, 2) with a minimum level of
variety and quality of options offered, 3) with a minimum decision-making
competence (Fleurbaey et al., 2008). A comprehensive egalitarian theory of
justice is not just about equalising available opportunities but also about
providing adequate opportunities and making them accessible. As per our
definition of AI ethics Floridi and Cowls, we define autonomy as the power to
decide, striking a balance between the decision-making power humans retain
and that which we delegate to artificial agents. We also define explicability
as the combination of intelligibility (how it works) and accountability (who
is responsible for the way it works). It complements the other four principles
by helping us understand the good or harm an algorithmic system is actually
doing to society, in which ways, and why Floridi and Cowls.
4.2.1 Autonomy: Liberty
In enforcing some of the stricter fairness conditions, decision-makers should
be careful as to the potential impact this has on human autonomy. Luck
egalitarians, for instance, have no principled objection to a society in which,
on a background of equal opportunities, some end up in poverty or as the
slaves of others (Fleurbaey et al., 2008) – this could violate fundamental
human rights to freedom and result in undesirable levels of extreme societal
inequality. Intervention is necessary when basic autonomy is at stake, and
this should be a constraint on definition of fairness. Fleurbaey argues this
is consistent with egalitarian welfare economics, as egalitarians should be
concerned—not only with equality of opportunities—but also with the con-
tent of the opportunities themselves, with freedom as the leading principle
in defining responsibility in social justice (Fleurbaey et al., 2008).
By focusing on equality of opportunities, one may dismiss the differences
in preferences as driven by choice and thus irrelevant. However, Fleurbaey
argues that the ex post inequalities due to differences in preferences are also
a target for intervention on the grounds of improving the range of choices
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to suit everyone’s preferences. If more women prefer lower-paid positions
than men, what is problematic is not only the societal and environnmental
conditioning that questions whether this is a genuine preference, but also
the unfair advantage that attaches to these jobs – a differential value of
the “menu” of options for women than for men because of their preferences
(Fleurbaey et al., 2008). Considerations of fairness and the associated policy
response must operate at the level of the menu, rather than distribution of
jobs themselves.
4.2.2 Autonomy: Forgiveness
Fleurbaey also discusses a concept that is not addressed in algorithmic fair-
ness literature: forgiveness. He argues that the ideal of freedom and au-
tonomy contains the idea of “fresh starts”: in absence of cost to others, it
is desirable to give people more freedom and a greater array of choices in
the future (Fleurbaey et al., 2008). This is in conflict with the “unforgiving
conception of equality of opportunities” that ties individuals to the conse-
quences of one’s choices (Fleurbaey et al., 2008). In many countries, lenders
are restricted in their access to information about borrowers’ past defaults;
for example, many delinquencies are removed from U.S. credit reports after
seven years (Elul and Gottardi, 2015). Forcing a lender to ignore informa-
tion about past behaviour may reduce the accuracy of its default prediction
model, and it may be “unfair” by some definitions by putting those who
have made more responsible financial decisions on equal level as those who
have not; however, it is widely accepted practice to ensure that one decision
does not have a disproportionate impact of limiting one’s access to credit for
good. A more complete coverage of fairness and justice, therefore, should
go beyond redistribution of outcome features and consider the impact on
individual welfare, autonomy, and freedom.
4.2.3 Autonomy: Vulnerability
Autonomy in rational decision-making also falters as an ethical objective
when there is a significant asymmetry of power and information between two
parties. Contractarian perspectives on fairness assumes two equal entities
exchanging one resource for another(Gauthier, 1986).
Those with limited autonomy include vulnerable customers. When an
algorithm targets and manipulates those with no other options, they do not
have the autonomy to enter into the contract, whether or not the contract
is fair. Payday loans and check cashing industry in the US targets those
who cannot access traditional financial services, often due to their illegal
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immigration status or long working hours that do not provide a break while
a bank is open for business, entrapping the most vulnerable groups into an
unbreakable cycle of debt with unaffordable interest rates (Prager et al.,
2009). While the interest rate may not necessarily be unfair (it may in some
cases be proportional to the likelihood of an individual’s repayment), it is
ethically undesirable. The same principle applies to marketing insurance
products to those with recent bereavement or the sale of complex financial
instruments to someone without the capability of understanding their risks.
Another group is those with “thin” files, with a lack of or sparse credit his-
tory. There has been a movement to use “alternative data” or non-traditional
data sources that do not directly relate to the borrower’s ability to repay. One
of the most extreme cases is the use of Internet browsing history, location,
and payment data to calculate credit risk (Koren, 2016). The justification is
often that this increases financial inclusion for those without alternate means
to access credit. However, this requires the lender access to more data from
the currently unbanked populations, disproportionately forcing them to give
up more of their privacy than those with existing credit histories. It also pro-
vides additional risk of discrimination, as the non-traditional data sources are
likely to be closely intertwined with personal characteristics. Location and
social media data are more likely to reveal an individual’s race and gender
than credit history. While Kenya’s poor were among the first to benefit from
digital lending applications, they have led to a predatory cycle of debt the
borrowers describe as a new form of slavery, between the endless nudges to
borrow, the lenders’ control over a vast archive of user data, and the balloon-
ing interest payments (Donovan and Park, 2019). This double-standard of
privacy between the unbanked and banked violates the equal rights of indi-
viduals to privacy and self-determination. While there may be an exchange
of access to credit and personal data (e.g. if an individual gives consent to a
personality test or access to his/her social media profile), there should be a
protection of their right to privacy.
Fairness overall must be considered in the context of the impact on indi-
vidual human rights – going beyond the equality of available opportunities,
empowering human freedom and autonomy to ensure accessibility of these
opportunities. Computer scientists can learn from the welfare economists’
consideration of autonomy as a crucial component of egalitarian perspectives
on fairness.
4.2.4 Explicability
Welfare economics is built on the assumption of rational, free agents, which
is shared in Kantian ethical philosophy (Kant and Gregor, 1996). This has
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been applied to medical ethics to mandate that a patient be able to make
a fully informed decision on whether or not to receive treatment (Eaton,
2004). Similarly, in algorithmic decision-making, individuals consenting to
the usage of their data should fully understand how the data will be used.
When humans employ autonomous systems, they cede, at least provisionally,
some of their own autonomy (decision-making power) to machines (Floridi
and Cowls, 2019). Respecting human autonomy thus becomes a matter of
ensuring that both the decision-making authority and the subject of the
decision retain enough autonomy to safeguard their well-being.
In order to incorporate the algorithm into rational decision-making, it is
important to understand how the algorithm reached its prediction or recom-
mendation. Due to the relatively limited interpretability of ML, “explainable
AI” (xAI) is an ongoing area of research (Xu, Uszkoreit, Du, Fan, Zhao, and
Zhu, 2019). There is often a trade-off between accuracy of an algorithm
and its explainability, as complex phenomena are better represented by com-
plex, “black-box” models than simple and interpretable models. This may,
in turn, represent a trade-off between explainability (and thus a decision-
maker’s capability for reasoning) and any beneficence afforded by the in-
crease in accuracy and model performance. In some use cases, e.g. film
recommendations, accuracy may outweigh the need for explanations. The
explanations may vary based on the target of the explanation, e.g. customer,
regulator, domain experts, or system developers (Arya, Bellamy, Chen, Dhu-
randhar, Hind, Hoffman, Houde, Liao, Luss, Mojsilović, et al., 2019). It is
important to understand the interplay between an algorithm’s explanation
and its perceived fairness. There may be a number of possible explanations
for any given decision, and the techniques for xAI alone do not detect or
correct unfair outcomes. However, the explanations may help identify po-
tential variables that are driving the unfair outcomes, e.g. if pricing varies
for female-dominated professions compared to male-dominated professions,
the model may be relying on occupation for its prediction, which acts as a
proxy for gender.
While fairness formalisations may provide a simple methodology for model
developers to incorporate metrics relevant to equalisation of outcomes be-
tween groups and individuals, they do not provide a holistic view of the
important debates on what fairness means, as they are discussed in ethical
philosophy and welfare economics. The narrow definition of unfair bias in
each of these metrics only provides a partial snapshot of what inequalities
and biases are affecting the model and does not consider the long-term and
big-picture ethical goals beyond this equalisation.
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5 Proposed method: Key Ethics Indicators
In this final section, we propose a new approach that moves away from at-
tempts to define fairness mathematically, and instead, gain a more holistic
view of the ethical considerations of a model. Due to the subjectivity of
fairness metrics, it may be challenging to select one over another. Rather
than these general metrics, decision-makers should create a customised mea-
surement of what “fair” looks like in each model. In addition, fairness should
not be considered in isolation from the related ethical goals. The interaction
between fairness and other values - e.g. welfare, autonomy, and explicability
- should be taken into account in this analysis.
Contrary to claims otherwise (Heidari et al., 2018), the roles and respon-
sibilities of a developer are necessarily intertwined with the role of the expert
or business stakeholder, as the ethical and practical valuations of what “suc-
cess” looks like in the model directly influences the algorithm design, build,
and testing. It is important to have active engagement from the beginning
between the developer and the subject matter expert to try to understand
which inequalities should influence the outcome and how to address the in-
equalities that should not play a role in the prediction. This process requires
engagement from all relevant parties, including the business owner and the
technical owner, with potential input from regulators, customers, and legal
experts.
Relying solely on the out-of-the-box fairness definitions as implemented
in fairness toolkits would fail to capture the nuanced ethical trade-offs. For a
decision-maker, it is important to devise customised success metrics specific
to the context of each model, which as we described, involves considering
welfare (beneficence, non-maleficence), autonomy, fairness, and explicability.
This can be done in a following process:
1. Define “success” from an ethical perspective. What is the benefit of a
more accurate algorithm to the consumer, to society, and to the system?
What are the potential harms of false positives and false negatives? Are
there any fundamental rights at stake?
2. Identify the layers of inequality that are affecting the differences in
outcome
3. Identify the layers of bias
4. Devise an appropriate mitigation strategy. This may require changes
to data collection mechanism or to existing processes, rather than a
technical solution.
22
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3679975
5 PROPOSED METHOD: KEY ETHICS INDICATORS
5. Operationalise these objectives into quantifiable metrics, build multiple
models and calculate the trade-offs between the objectives covering all
ethical and practical dimensions.
6. Select the model that best reflects the decision-maker’s values and rel-
ative prioritisation of objectives.
We now elaborate each of these steps, in turn.
5.1 Define success
For each use case, there are unique considerations on what is considered a
“successful” model, which are unlikely to be captured in a single mathemati-
cal formula. In credit risk evaluation, for example, three key objectives from
ethical, regulatory, and practical standpoints are: 1) allocative efficiency: a
more accurate assessment of loan affordability protects both the lender and
the customer from expensive and harmful default, 2) distributional fairness:
increasing access to credit to disadvantaged borrowers, including “thin-file”
borrowers and minority groups, 3) autonomy: both increased scope of harm
due to identity theft and security risk and due to the effects of ubiquitous
data collection on privacy (Aggarwal, 2020). Here, a successful credit risk
model would achieve all three objectives. By contrast, in algorithmic hiring,
success metrics may include employee performance, increased overall diver-
sity among employees and in leadership, and employee satisfaction with the
role. It is important to identify all the objectives of interest, such that any
trade-offs between them may be easily identified, allowing for a more holistic
view of algorithmic ethics.
5.2 Identify sources of inequality
As previously discussed, due to the complex and entangled sources of in-
equalities and bias affecting an algorithm, there is no simple mathematical
solution to unfairness. It is important to understand what types of inequality
are acceptable vs. unacceptable in each use case. Table 2 presents different
layers of inequality. Considering a credit risk evaluation, socioeconomic and
talent inequalities may be considered relevant: if a man has a higher income
than a woman, he may receive a higher credit limit given his higher ability
to repay; higher education level and expertise in a high-demand field may
indicate greater job security. Forcing the decision-maker to look beyond the
legally protected characteristics to identify the inequalities that are accept-
able and relevant and those that are not helps better identify the sub-groups
that are at risk of discrimination.
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5.3 Identify sources of bias
In addition to the inequalities discussed above, there may be biases in the
model development lifecycle that exacerbate the existing inequalities between
two groups. The challenge is that in many cases, the patterns associated with
the target outcome are also associated with one’s identity, including race and
gender.
Suresh and Guttang (2020) have recently grouped these types of biases
into 6 categories: historical, representation, measurement, aggregation, eval-
uation, and deployment. Historical bias refers to past discrimination and
inequalities, and the remaining five biases, displayed in Table 5, align to the
phases of the model development lifecycle (data collection, feature selection,
model build, model evaluation, and productionisation) that may inaccurately
skew the predictions. By understanding the type of bias that exists, the de-
veloper can identify the phase in which the bias was introduced, allowing
him or her to design a targeted mitigation strategy for each bias type.
Table 5 gives examples in racial discrimination in lending processes to
demonstrate each type of bias. For a practical tool in identifying unintended
biases in these six categories, see: Lee and Singh (2021). Crucially, they point
out that effective bias mitigation addresses the bias at its source, which may
involve a non-technical solution. For example, bias introduced through the
data collection process may require a change in marketing strategy.
5.4 Design mitigation strategies
The mitigation strategy depends on whether we believe the inequalities in
Table 2 and the biases in Table 5 need to be actively corrected to rebalance
the inequalities and bias. It is important to understand the source of the
bias in order to address it.
There have been existing methods proposed for pre-processing, removing
bias from the data before the algorithm build, in-processing, building an
algorithm with bias-related constraints, and post-processing, adjusting the
output predictions of an algorithm. However, these methods presume that
inequalities in Table 2 and the biases in Table 5 are known and can be
quantified and surgically removed. How do we isolate the impact of talent
and preference inequalities on income from the impact of discrimination?
The attempt to “repair” the proxies to remove the racial bias has been shown
to be impractical and ineffective when the predictors are correlated to the
protected characteristic; even strong covariates are often legitimate factors
for decisions (Corbett-Davies and Goel, 2018).
Often, the solution to these biases is not technical because their sources
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Types of bias Examples Variable
Representation bias Limited marketing and outreach
in high-minority neighborhoods
Bias 0
Measurement bias Unequal treatment in the lend-
ing process associated with race
leads to mis-measurement of risk
factors
Bias 1
Aggregation bias There may be a difference in de-
fault frequency distribution be-
tween racial groups, which is
poorly represented by a single
model
Bias 2
Evaluation bias The accuracy and precision met-
rics in default prediction vary
across racial groups (e.g. lower
confidence in predictions for mi-
nority borrowers)
Bias 3
Deployment bias True outcome only known for ac-
cepted loans and unknown for
denied loans
Bias 4
Table 5: Layers of bias resulting in inaccurate predictions (*partial and in-
dicative)
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are not inherent in the technique. Instead of looking for a mathematical
solution, there may be productive ways of counteracting these biases with
changes to the process and strategy. Examples are shown in Table 6.
Types of bias Variable Example action
Treatment inequality / so-
cietal discrimination (exter-
nal)
Inequality 4 Identify a new feature to esti-
mate income volatility associated
with race
Representation bias Bias 0 Change in marketing and out-
reach strategy to include more
high-minority neighborhoods
Measurement bias Bias 1 Employee training on subcon-
scious bias, standardized prac-
tice on which loan types are
recommended based on pre-
specified relevant criteria
Deployment bias Bias 2 Continuous monitoring and anal-
ysis of whether the decision
boundary between rejection and
acceptance is appropriate
Table 6: Possible actions to counteract biases (*partial and indicative)
While the mitigation strategies are important, they are unlikely to provide
a complete solution to the problem of algorithmic bias and fairness. That
is because—unlike the assumptions underlying fairness formalisations—it is
often not feasible to mathematically measure and surgically remove unfair
bias from a model, which is affected by inequalities and biases that are deeply
entrenched in society and in the data.
Legal scholars have argued that traditional approach of scrutinising the
inputs to a model is no longer effective due to the rising model complexity.
Using Fair Lending law as an example, Gillis demonstrates that identify-
ing which features are relevant vs. irrelevant fails to address discrimination
concerns because combinations of seemingly relevant inputs may drive dis-
parate outcomes between racial group (Gillis, 2020). Rather than focusing
on identifying and justifying inputs and policies that drive disparities, Gillis
argues, it is important to shift to an outcome-focused analysis of whether
a model leads to impermissible outcomes (Gillis, 2020). Similarly, Lee and
Floridi have proposed an approach to assess whether the outcome of a model
is desirable (Lee and Floridi, 2020). For a more comprehensive analysis of
whether a model meets the stakeholders’ ethical criteria, it is important to
look beyond the inputs and the designer’s intent and assess the long-term
and holistic outcome.
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5.5 Operationalise Key Ethics Indicators (KEIs), cal-
culate trade-offs between KEIs
Once “success” for a model has been defined at a high-level, the next step is
to operationalise the ethical principles such that they are measurable. Sim-
ilarly to how a company may define a set of quantifiable values to gauge
its achievements using Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), there should
be outcome-based, quantifiable statements from an ethical standpoint: Key
Ethics Indicators (KEI), enabling developers to manage and track to what
extent each model is meeting the stated objectives.
For example, Lee and Floridi estimate the impact of each default risk
prediction algorithm on financial inclusion and on loan access for black bor-
rowers (Lee and Floridi, 2020). They operationalise financial inclusion as
the total expected value of loans under each model and minority loan access
as the loan denial rate of black applicants under each model. In Figure 1
replicated from their work, they calculate the trade-offs between the two ob-
jectives for five algorithms, providing actionable insights for all stakeholders
on the relative success of each model.
Figure 1: Replicated from Lee and Floridi (2020): Trade-off analysis
Context-specific KEIs can be developed for each use case. For example,
in algorithmic hiring, employee satisfaction with a role may be estimated by
attrition rates and employee tenure, employee performance may be measured
through their annual review process, and diversity may be calculated across
gender, university, region, age group, and race, depending on each organisa-
tion’s objectives and values. Making explicit the ethical objectives in each
use case would help decision-makers justify the use of any algorithm, which
could in turn lead to the establishment of industry standards, informing best
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practices, policy design, and regulatory activity.
5.6 Select a model and provide justifications
The trade-off analysis makes the ethical considerations clear. For example,
in Figure 1, Lee and Floridi conclude that Random forest is better in abso-
lute terms (in both financial inclusion and impact on minorities) than Näıve
Bayes, but the decision is more ambiguous between CART and LR: while
CART is more accurate and results in greater financial inclusion (equivalent
of $15.6 million of loans, or 103 median-value loans), CART results in a 3.8
percentage points increase in denial rates for black loan applicants compared
to LR. This quantifies the concrete stakes to the decision-maker who may
decide on the model that is most suited to his or her priorities, customised
to each use case.
One of the key benefits of the outcome-driven KEI trade-off analysis
is that it provides interpretable and actionable insights into the decision-
maker’s values, which is especially important for complex machine learning
algorithms in which the exact mechanism may not be transparent or in-
terpretable. This could also provide valuable justification to the regulator
on why a certain model was seen as preferable to all other reasonable al-
ternatives. This may also help reduce the hesitation among decision-makers
around the use of machine learning models due to their non-transparent risks,
if the analysis shows they are superior to traditional rules-based models in
meeting each of the KEIs. Suitable records of the decisions must be kept,
ensuring the model and its design are reviewable (Cobbe, Lee, and Singh,
2021).
Conclusion
Implementations of fairness toolkits have predominantly implemented math-
ematical fairness definitions without locating their implications in overall
algorithmic ethics. One of our contributions is to derive lessons from ethical
philosophy and from welfare economics on what are the contextual consid-
erations that are important in assessing an algorithm’s ethics beyond what
can be captured in a mathematical formula. For example, we refer to the
debate in ethical philosophy on what constitutes acceptable vs. unacceptable
inequalities. We also relate to the explicit consideration in welfare economics
of welfare and liberty, which are associated with algorithmic ethics principles
of beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy, and explicability. Over-reliance
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on fairness metrics would capture only one dimension of an algorithm’s eth-
ical impact.
As a step forward, our second contribution is the proposal of a gener-
alised “Key Ethics Indicator” (KEI) approach that explicitly considers the
ethical objectives, aligning to the contextual features that we have drawn
out as important in ethical philosophy and welfare economics literature. The
widespread discomfort with the use of ML to make decisions derives from the
tension between the opportunity provided by algorithms that can more accu-
rately predict an outcome and the risk of systematically reinforcing existing
biases in the data and the risk of undermining human autonomy. On the
other hand, unlike human subconscious biases, machine predictions can be
systematically audited, debated, and improved. By understanding the holis-
tic ethical considerations of each algorithmic decision-making process using
KEIs, decision-makers can be better informed about the value judgements,
assumptions, and consequences of their algorithmic design, opening up the
conversations with regulators and with society on what is an ethical decision.
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